Intermediaries facilitate exchanges between buyers and sellers. Intermediation activities are an important part of the formal economy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether, besides eliminating uncertainty, intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible bribers and bribees. Indeed, intermediaries might create psychological distance between the briber and the corrupt transaction, and might institutionalize corruption. We address our research question using a speci…cally designed bribery lab experiment that simulates petty corruption transactions between private citizens and public o¢ cials. The experimental data con…rm that intermediaries lower the moral costs of citizens and o¢ cials and, thus, increase corruption.
Introduction
An intermediary is "an economic agent that purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers or that helps buyers and sellers meet and transact" (Spulber, 1996) . Intermediaries specialize in facilitating the exchange between buyers and sellers by getting expertise in sellers'goods and buyers'needs, thus reducing search and bargaining costs while building a reputation for credibility and trustworthiness. Intermediation activities are an important part of the economy. Spulber (1996) computes that in the United States intermediation activities such as retail and wholesale trade, …nance and insurance contribute about 28 percent of the GDP.
The present study represents the …rst step of a broader program of research aiming at investigating intermediation in illegal markets. Theoretically, we should expect more intermediation in illegal than in legal activities, due to the higher transaction costs generated by the need for secrecy and the lack of legal contract enforcement. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities. Bertrand et al. (2007) …nd that in India while most applicants pay bribes to get a drivers'license, "there is no evidence of direct bribes to bureaucrats... The extralegal payments are mainly fees to "agents," professionals who "assist" individuals in the process of obtaining their driver's licenses. . . . multiple pieces of evidence suggest that agents institutionalize corruption" (p. 1641). Oldenburg (1987) reports that in the land consolidation process in India in the early 1980s intermediaries were necessary due to their "special knowledge of the procedures, access to o¢ cials, time to spend, and dirty hands" (p. 527). Fjeldstad (2003) explains the failure of the anti-corruption reform …rst implemented by the Tanzanian tax authority in 1996 as a result of the fact that many corrupt o¢ cers who had been …red either got employed by …rms as "tax experts" or set up their own agencies, and, thus, became "facilitators" of corruption. In a similar study conducted in Uganda Fjeldstad (2006) reaches similar conclusions. In Latin America, "coyotes"or "tramitadores"are often found next to government buildings ready to "help"individuals applying for licenses, permits or documents (see Lambsdor¤, 2002) . In several recent cases of corruption involving large …rms bribing public o¢ cials in foreign countries, such as the BAE and Chrysler cases, the use of intermediaries is routinely mentioned. 1 The above studies suggest that middlemen are employed in corrupt transactions be- 1 A recent survey of Norwegian exporting …rms (Søreide, 2006) shows widespread use of intermediaries to by-pass anti-corruption regulations; when asked about the most important quality of an intermediary, 50% of the …rms pointed at the intermediary's ties with relevant decision makers. For a legal perspective on the issue of intermediaries used by …rms in foreign countries, and related case studies, see Bray (2004) .
cause they eliminate uncertainty with respect to whom and how much to bribe, and guarantee the enforcement of the illegal "contract". 2 Note that these two tasks of the intermediary are not speci…c to illegal activities. Indeed, intermediaries reduce uncertainty and facilitate contract enforcement also in the context of legal transactions.
There are two additional roles that intermediaries may play speci…cally in corrupt activities: they may reduce the risk of detection of both briber and bribee, 3 and they may lower the moral costs that potential bribers and bribees (might) su¤er from engaging in corruption, and thus further facilitate corrupt transactions. Indeed, by acting as professionals with superior information and expertise, and by charging fees -rather than bribes -in exchange for their services, intermediaries might generate the belief that the services in question are neither illegal, nor socially condemned. Such belief may be reinforced by the fact that, by going through an intermediary, the client does not interact with the bureaucrat, and therefore at no time does he or she actively engage in bribery. As observed by Oldenburg (1987) , the intermediary in corrupt transactions "...lets it be known that he is willing to dirty his hands: not only is he experienced (knows the subtle hints, knows the techniques of passing money), but making use of him also allows the briber to distance himself from the transaction" (p. 527). As a consequence, intermediaries may decrease the moral or psychological costs that potential bribers may su¤er from engaging in corruption. Indeed, evidence from specially designed lab experiments (Hamman et carried out indirectly rather than directly are judged less unethical than direct actions. 4 If, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2007) , the presence of an intermediary is interpreted as a signal of institutionalized corruption, it may reduce the moral cost of potential bribers even further, and also reduce the moral cost of public o¢ cials. 2 In economics, the commitment e¤ect of delegation can be traced to Schelling (1960) . Schotter et al. (2000) and Van Huyck et al. (1995) provide experimental evidence on the commitment e¤ect of delegation.
See also Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) for an investigation of delegation as a committment device in the context of an ultimatum game. 3 This is due to the intermediary's expertise and knowledge of both the organization of the corrupt system and the people that ought to be involved in the process. The risk of detection of the client may be further lowered because, even if the intermediary is found guilty of bribery, the client could deny responsibility, arguing the intermediary bribed on his own initiative 4 Section 2.2 provides a review of the experimental studies on this topic. This paper focuses on this speci…c role that intermediaries may play in corrupt activities. In particular, we ask whether intermediaries lower the moral or psychological cost that potential bribers and bribees might su¤er when engaging in corruption. We use data generated by a speci…cally designed laboratory experiment that simulates corrupt transactions between "private citizens" and "public o¢ cials". While the transaction bene…ts a citizen-o¢ cial pair, it generates negative externalities on an "other member of society".
By conducting di¤erent versions of the game, in which we alter the degree of uncertainty and/or the presence of the intermediary, we are able to isolate the moral cost-reducing role that intermediaries may play in corruption exchanges.
Our results con…rm that the presence of the intermediary signi…cantly increases corruption. While we …nd evidence that this increase is partly driven by the elimination of uncertainty, there is more to the role of the intermediary. In particular, our data suggest that the presence of the intermediary leads to a reduction in the moral or psychological costs of both private citizens and public o¢ cials, and thus further increases corruption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing theoretical investigations on the role of intermediaries in corruption, and review the experimental literature on delegation and bribery. Section 3 describes our bribery experiment, theoretical framework and predictions. Section 4 presents our results and Section 5 concludes.
2 A review of the literature
Theoretical studies of intermediaries in corruption
The economic literature on intermediaries in corruption is surprisingly small. The latest ing candidates have to queue in order to apply for and possibly obtain a given service.
Undeserving candidates can receive the service only through corruption, and therefore need to be served by a corruptible o¢ cial. However, individuals learn whether the bureaucrat is corruptible only after queuing and getting to the counter. On the other hand, intermediaries know which bureaucrats are corrupt and by directing each candidate either to a honest or a corruptible bureaucrat, depending on the candidate's type, save the candidates'waiting time. As a result, the number of undeserving candidates who are able to get the service increases and social welfare decreases. Bjorvatn et al. (2005) , inspired by the proliferation of intermediaries which followed a tax agency anti-corruption reform in Tanzania (Fjeldstad, 2003 , mentioned above) build a model in which an anti-corruption reform, such as sta¤ rotation in public o¢ ces or an increase in punishment of corrupt bureaucrats, increases the uncertainty with respect to whom and how much to bribe. This raises the demand for intermediaries and, if intermediation has some …xed costs (such as loss of an alternative income), may lead to the emergence of intermediaries when none existed before. Therefore, since intermediaries are more e¢ cient in conducting corrupt transactions, an anti-corruption reform may actually cause corruption to increase.
While the above studies focus on the uncertainty-reduction role of intermediaries in corruption, Hasker and Okten (2008) look at two additional tasks of intermediaries: the enforcement of corrupt deals and the reduction of the risk of detection of both briber and bribee. They …nd that intermediaries decrease the amount of regulation (which is welfare detrimental in the model) and, again, reduce the e¤ectiveness of possible anticorruption policies. Similarly to Bjorvatn et al. (2005) , one implication of their study is that, in the presence of intermediaries, some anti-corruption interventions, such as an increase in the sanctions associated with corruption and the introduction of sta¤-rotation in public o¢ ces, may paradoxically increase corruption. The intuition is that while these policies decrease the number of clients bribing the bureaucrats directly, they increase the number of those who bribe through intermediaries, and the latter e¤ect may overweight the former, leading to an overall increase in corruption.
Experimental studies of delegation
There are no theoretical studies, to the best of our knowledge, investigating whether, in addition to eliminating uncertainty, enforcing corrupt contracts and reducing the probabil-ity of detection, intermediaries may lower the moral or psychological costs that potential bribers and bribees may su¤er when engaging in corruption. However, recent experimental work in economics highlights the psychological e¤ect of delegation in non-strategic situations. …nd that delegating decisions that involve fairness concerns leads to signi…cant reductions in fair behavior. They conduct several conditions of a repeated dictator game in which dictators had the option to choose an agent from a pool of available agents to make the allocation decision on their behalf. The amounts given to recipients was signi…cantly less when an agent was used (in some cases, giving was reduced to zero). Hamman et al. also …nd that principals who delegate these decisions do not feel responsible for the outcome. This holds true even if principals know with very high probability that their intermediary will choose an unfair action in the principal's favor.
Bartling and Fischbacher (2011) study responsibility and punishment employing a oneshot dictator game played by a dictator, a delegee and two recipients. The dictator had to choose between a fair outcome, which would give the 4 players equal payo¤s, or an unfair outcome, which would give a high payo¤ to the dictator and the delegee and a low payo¤ to the recipients. The dictator could make this binary decision himself/herself or delegate the decision to the delegee. Bartling and Fischbacher …nd that delegating unfair actions leads to less responsibility attribution by recipients towards principals and, therefore, recipients punish principals less often when they delegate, even when this delegation directly leads to an unfair outcome. Co¤man (2010) …nds similar results using a standard (i.e. non-binary choice) dictator game, where the dictator could choose how much to allocate to the recipient or "sell"the decision right to a delegee. Here, delegation reduces the total amount available for sharing with the recipient, and responsibility attribution is investigated by looking at a third party's willingness to punish the dictator when he/she delegates, as compared to the case when delegation is not allowed. Co¤man …nds that the third party punishes the dictator signi…cantly less when allocation happens through delegation, even if delegation naturally reduces the amount that could be (and that is) allocated to the recipient.
The above experimental studies have identi…ed "responsibility di¤usion"and/or shifting of responsibility as the main channel through which delegation induces more sel…sh behavior on the part of the delegator, and less punishment by both the victim of the sel…sh action or a third party. The moral psychology literature has identi…ed an additional channel: delegation leads to indirect rather than direct harm or unethical behavior, and therefore creates psychological distance between the delegator and the action itself, another subject/…rm and asking them to state how unethical (on an eleven point scale)
they deemed each behavior. The authors found that even when the delegee or agent "was a transparent instrument of the primary agent, acting under contract such that the primary agent had full knowledge and control"actions carried out indirectly were judged less unethical than direct actions. 6 In line with the insights provided by the moral psychology literature, we suspect that the presence of an intermediary may reduce the moral or psychological costs of a potential briber, say a private citizen, as it may create psychological distance between himself/herself and the illegal activity that could potentially damage other people. Contrary to the act of o¤ering a bribe, the act of accepting a bribe is always a direct act, regardless of the presence of the intermediary. Therefore, we do not expect the presence of the intermediary to lower the moral or psychological cost of public o¢ cials by creating psychological distance between the o¢ cial and the illegal activity. However, if the existence of agents who provide intermediation for acts of corruption is seen as a signal that corruption is institutionalized, and therefore not illegal after all, the moral or psychological costs of potential bribees, i.e. the public o¢ cials, may also go down. 7 
Experimental studies of bribery
Experimental studies of corruption represent a growing …eld of study. 8 Given our main research question, here we provide a brief overview of the experimental evidence on the 6 preferences "could not be fully explained in terms of di¤erences in judgments about which action was more active, more intentional, more likely to cause harm, or more subject to the disapproval of others" (p.. 165). 7 The perceived institutionalization of corruption may also lower further the moral or psychological costs of potential bribers. 8 See aso Abbink (2006) for the latest survey of experimental studies on corruption.
role that moral costs, or more generally intrinsic, non-monetary motivations, may play in individuals'decision to engage in or abstain from bribery. 9 Abbink et al. (2002) conducted the …rst lab experiment designed to investigate people's willingness to engage in bribery. In their repeated game, a briber had to decide whether and how much to o¤er as a bribe without knowing whether the bribee would be willing to grant him a higher payo¤ (simulating the provision of the corrupt service) in return and the bribee was free to reject the bribe, accept and grant the higher payo¤, or accept but not grant the higher payo¤. Under one of the treatments, whenever a bribe was It is these transactions that we investigate in the present study. Indeed, the functions of the intermediaries appear to be especially desirable when the relationships between potential bribers and public o¢ cials are sporadic and fragmentary.
The bribery experiment
Our bribery experiment builds on the design of Barr and Serra (2009) . The game simulates a petty corruption exchange in which a private citizen must decide whether and how much to o¤er a public o¢ cial as a bribe in exchange for a corrupt service, such as a reduction in tax, preferential treatment in a court hearing, or speedier admission to hospital. In turn, the public o¢ cial has to decide whether, and how much, to accept as a bribe. If a bribe is o¤ered and accepted, the briber-bribee pair bene…ts, while an "other members of society" (OMS) incurs a cost. The game therefore involves citizen-o¢ cial-OMS triples. 10 Roles and group-matching are randomly assigned and play is anonymous and one-shot.
As mentioned above, the experiment is designed to simulate a petty corruption scenario in which both sides of a petty corruption exchange tend to be executed more or less simultaneously, rendering trust, reciprocity and repetition unimportant and excludable from the design. Although repeated corrupt exchanges relying on trust and reciprocation, and usually taking place between public o¢ cials and businesses, are certainly important, many corrupt transactions take place only once between public o¢ cials and ordinary citizens. 11 These exchanges, while referred to as 'petty', are nevertheless a cause for concern as they harm others who are unable to engage in bribery themselves. This motivates the decision to have a passive other member of society in the game, i.e., a subject who su¤ers a monetary loss when corruption takes place between a citizen and a public of…cial but cannot engage himself in bribery and does not have means to punish those who act corruptly. 12 Moreover, given our primary objective to investigate non-monetary costs associated with corruption, we do not introduce any risk of external detection and punishment in the game. 13 In order to investigate the role that intermediaries may play in reducing uncertainty and the moral costs of possible bribers and bribees, we designed and conducted three versions, or treatments, of the game: 1) a baseline treatment; 2) an intermediary treatment; and 3) a treatment with no uncertainty (and no intermediary). In the baseline treatment, the private citizen has to decide whether and how much to o¤er as a bribe to the matched public o¢ cial without knowing the minimum bribe that the matched public o¢ cial is willing to accept. Therefore, it is possible that a citizen is willing to engage in bribery but the bribe o¤ered ends up being too low for the matched o¢ cial. It is also possible that a corruptible o¢ cial is matched with a citizen who is unwilling to engage in corruption, or vice versa. As a result, corruption may not take place, despite the willingness to engage in corruption of either one or both the parties involved in the exchange.
In the intermediary treatment, we introduce a fourth player: the intermediary. Therefore the game is played by four players: a private citizen, a public o¢ cial, an intermediary and an OMS. The intermediary has information about the lowest bribe that the o¢ cial is willing to accept, if any, and communicates this information to the matched citizen.
Therefore, in this case, the citizen has to decide not if and how much to o¤er as a bribe, but whether or not to pay a fee that would allow the intermediary to o¤er the lowest bribe that the o¢ cial would be willing to accept. We do not allow the intermediary to participate in the determination of the bribe or the fee, or to refuse to participate in the transaction. Moreover, we provide the citizen with complete information with respect to how the fee paid to the intermediary is determined and how it would be used to bribe the o¢ cial. Therefore, similarly to Paharia et al. (2009) psychological costs. It could be argued that in reality the intermediary has an active role in determining the fee demanded from private citizens, and therefore "di¤usion of responsibility" may further lower the moral or psychological costs of potential bribees.
These observations make our design and results conservative.
In order to isolate the e¤ect that the intermediary may have in reducing moral costs of citizen and o¢ cial from the e¤ects of no uncertainty, in the third treatment we do not have an intermediary but we eliminate uncertainty by providing each citizen with information about the minimum acceptable bribe (MAB) of the matched o¢ cial. Therefore, in this case, similarly to the case with intermediary, the citizen has to decide not whether and how much to o¤er as a bribe, but whether to pay or not the o¢ cial's MAB.
Note that in the intermediary and in the no uncertainty treatments, if the o¢ cial knew that his MAB would determine the exact bribe that would be paid by a (compliant) citizen, the o¢ cial would probably overstate his MAB, a¤ecting in this way the probability that corrupt exchange takes place. In order to eliminate the resulting confounds from the experiment -since our aim is to identify the uncertainty-reducing and the moral cost-reducing roles of the intermediary only -we do not inform the o¢ cial of the fact that his stated MAB will be communicated to the citizen. In this way, the o¢ cials'MABs are perfectly comparable across treatments, and serve as proxies of the o¢ cials'moral costs associated with corruption. We believe that our design complies with the norm of experimenter honesty, since at no point did we lie to our experimental subjects. 14 Moreover, by preventing participants in the role of public o¢ cials from behaving strategically by reporting a false MAB, our design induced truthful rather untruthful play. 15 1 4 This design element is similar in purpose to a block design seen in other experimental research. In these, subjects play several multi-period stages and learn the instructions for each stage only when the stage is reached. Examples include, but are not limited to, Brandts and Cooper (2006) , and Hamman, Weber, and Woon (2010). 1 5 In this aspect, our design is similar to that of Ellingsen et al. (2010) , which elicit recipient beliefs in
Theoretical framework
In this section we present a theoretical framework that allows us to formally investigate the impact that the presence of the intermediary might have on individuals'propensities to engage in bribery, as well as the size of the bribe, if we assume that the intermediary decreases the moral costs of those involved in corruption. Note that here we do not aim to build a general model of intermediaries in corruption, but rather provide a simple illustrative theoretical framework that is as close as possible to the experimental treatments that we run, and therefore allows us to generate clear predictions on individuals'behavior in the game.
Citizens and o¢ cials play in pairs. Each private citizen receives an initial endowment, a Dictator game and communicates these beliefs to the dictator before the dictator makes the allocation decision; yet, in order to elicit truthful beliefs, the authors do not inform the recipients that their beliefs will be communicated to the dictator. 1 6 The uniform distribution is assumed only to obtain simple closed-form solutions. None of the results qualitatively depends on this assumption.
In this setting, if the private citizen decides to o¤er the bribe, he solves the problem
No uncertainty
Now, the private citizen decides whether to o¤er or not a bribe knowing the moral cost of the o¢ cial m p . Thus, he o¤ers a bribe exactly equal to m p if his resulting payo¤ is positive,
. Since the private citizen now responds to a given m p , a refusal to pay this bribe means either that he is corruptible but the bribe is too high or that he is not corruptible. The probability that corruption happens is equal to the probability that the citizen pays the bribe, which is Prfm c + m
2mcmp . The probability that the public o¢ cial is willing to receive some bribe is that of m p being lower than v, that is, v mp .
Intermediary
Here we introduce a third player: the intermediary, whose role is to observe the bribe that the public o¢ cial would accept (which is equal to his moral cost) and communicate it to the private citizen. However, we also assume that, in addition to providing information to the private citizen, the intermediary lowers the moral costs of private citizen and public o¢ cials. In other words, we assume that in the presence of intermediary the moral cost 
, which is the same as with no intermediary and no uncertainty. 18 If m p < v, the probability that the public o¢ cial is willing to receive some bribe is that of m p being lower than v, that is, 1. The probability that corruption happens is equal to the probability that the citizen pays the bribe. This probability is equal to 
Predictions
Assuming that, as modelled above, the intermediary both eliminates uncertainty and reduces the moral costs of private citizens and public o¢ cials, and that the o¢ cial's stated minimum acceptable bribe (MAB) re ‡ects his moral cost associated with corruption, we can make the following prediction:
The average MAB is the same under uncertainty and under no uncertainty (with no intermediary). The presence of the intermediary can make the average MAB lower or higher; however, if most o¢ cials are corrupt even without the intermediary, the presence of the intermediary is likely to decrease the average MAB.
Indeed, the presence of the intermediary reduces the moral cost of the public o¢ cials which has two opposing e¤ects on the average MAB: 1) the o¢ cials that are corrupt even without the intermediary now have a lower MAB; and 2) some of the o¢ cials who were not corrupt without the intermediary now become corrupt, and since they have a higher moral cost, their addition to the pool of corrupt o¢ cials increases the average MAB. The total e¤ect can go either way. However, if most o¢ cials are corrupt even without the intermediary, the …rst e¤ect is stronger and the average MAB is likely to be lower than without intermediary.
Prediction 2:
The bribe paid in the case of a corrupt agreement is on average higher under uncertainty than under no uncertainty and in the presence of the intermediary since the citizen does not know the o¢ cial's MAB and is afraid of o¤ering a too low bribe. Comparing the average bribes paid under no uncertainty and in the presence of the intermediary amounts to comparing the average MABs (see Prediction 1). If most o¢ cials are corrupt even without the intermediary, the average bribe is likely to be lower in the presence of the intermediary.
Prediction 3:
The proportion of public o¢ cials willing to accept a bribe is the same under uncertainty and under no uncertainty; it is higher in the presence of the intermediary. The higher proportion of "corruptible"o¢ cials in the presence of the intermediary is due to a reduction in the o¢ cials'moral costs.
Prediction 4:
The proportion of citizens paying a bribe 19 -which also indicates the proportion of corrupt pairs, i.e., the occurrence of corruption -is lowest under uncertainty and highest in the presence of the intermediary.
The comparison between uncertainty and no uncertainty (with no intermediary),
indicates that corrupt exchanges are less likely to take place under uncertainty because the bribe that citizens believe they need to pay may be too high for some of the citizens.
Also, there is a chance that some citizens are simply unlucky and face an o¢ cial that demands a higher bribe that what they o¤ered. When the uncertainty is eliminated, the decision to engage in bribery is based on the observed MAB rather than the predicted "optimal bribe" and, therefore, some of the citizens who would abstain from bribing under uncertainty (or would be unlucky) now engage in bribery (and succeed for sure).
In the presence of the intermediary, besides the increase in the proportion of citizens paying a bribe as a consequence of no uncertainty, we also observe a further increase in citizens paying the requested bribe due to a reduction in the citizens'moral cost associated with corruption. The proportion of corrupt pairs rises further due to the increase in the proportion of corruptible o¢ cials caused by the reduction in their moral costs. Finally, if the presence of the intermediary decreases the average MAB, this leads to a further reduction in the requested bribe, and consequently, to a further increase in the proportion of citizens paying a bribe, i.e., an increase in the proportion of corrupt pairs. 1 9 In the baseline, these are the citizens who o¤ered a bribe that was accepted by the matched o¢ cials.
In the no uncertainty treatment these are the citizens that paid a bribe equal to the MAB of the matched o¢ cials.
Parameterization and implementation
We conducted the experiment using Experimental Currency Units, or ECU, where 1ECU equaled :25 USD. We set each player's endowment Y c = Y p = Y OM S = 35, and the value of the corrupt service to the citizen v equal to 16. In the experiment, we also assumed that in order to provide a corrupt service, the o¢ cial would have to sustain a cost K, which we set equal to 5. This represents the sum of the expected cost of being caught and punished, the cost of supplying the service, and the cost of any e¤orts made to reduce the likelihood of capture. We chose to make this cost deterministic rather than stochastic in order to reduce the potential impact of risk preferences on observed behavior. We also assumed that the citizen would have to sustain a small cost, E, when o¤ering a bribe, no matter whether the bribe is accepted or rejected. In the Intermediary treatment E is the commission to be paid to the intermediary in order to use the intermediation service. In order to keep the monetary incentives constant across treatments, we set E equal to 1 in all treatments. 20 If citizen and o¢ cial engaged in corruption, the matched OMS would su¤er a loss of 15 and therefore would end up with 20. Our design and parametrization imply that corruption is, by design, ine¢ cient.
In the baseline private citizens could choose to o¤er any bribe b 2 f1; 2; 3; : : : 20g. In all treatments, public o¢ cials, instead of responding only to the particular bribe o¤ered to them, had to state whether they would accept or reject each of the possible bribes, b 2 f1; 2; 3; : : : 20g, while knowing that whichever one of their responses turned out to be pertinent would determine their earnings. This full strategy elicitation enabled us to identify public o¢ cials who would reject any possible bribe -i.e. the "incorruptible" o¢ cials -and the minimum acceptable bribe (MAB) for the others. Put another way, the application of the strategy elicitation improved comparability as it ensured that each individual placed in the public o¢ cial role responded to the same set of possible stimuli.
Had their responses been directly elicited, the actual stimulus applied to each public o¢ cial would have varied in accordance with the bribe o¤er made by his or her briber. 21 2 0 For simplicity we did not include K and E in our theoretical framework. Their inclusion does not alter the comparative statics and our general predictions. In the no uncertainty treatment, citizens were informed of the MAB of their matched o¢ cials, and had to decide whether or not to pay a bribe equal to the MAB. In the intermediary treatment, citizens were also informed of the MAB of their matched o¢ cials, and had to decide whether to commission the intermediary to pay a bribe equal to the MAB to the o¢ cial. Note that while the bribe o¤ered by a citizen in the baseline, if any, could be either accepted or rejected by the matched o¢ cial, the bribe paid by a citizen in the treatments with no uncertainty would be automatically accepted by the o¢ cial.
At the end of the session, after each player received information about the …nal outcome of the corruption transaction, we administered a brief questionnaire.
We conducted 18 experimental sessions, involving a total of 409 students at Florida State University. Table 1 displays the distribution of sessions across the three treatments, and the total number of participants in the roles of citizen, o¢ cial, OMS and intermediary. All sessions were conducted at the xs/fs lab at Florida State University. The software used for this experiment was programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Each session lasted about 50 minutes and average earnings were 19 USD, which included a 10 USD participation fee.
Results
In this section we …rst report our …ndings with respect to individuals'behavior in the dif- The second panel of Table 2 compares the average bribes paid by the citizens; therefore, under uncertainty the average is computed only for the bribes that were o¤ered by the citizens and accepted by the matched o¢ cials. 23 In accordance to Prediction 2, we …nd that the bribe paid by the citizen is on average the highest under uncertainty, and the lowest in the presence of the intermediary, which is, once again, what we would expect
Experimental Findings
given that most o¢ cials are corrupt even without the intermediary.
The third panel of Table 2 suggests that the presence of the intermediary, but not the mere elimination of uncertainty, signi…cantly increases the proportion of corruptible o¢ cials. This is exactly what we would expect if the presence of the intermediary reduces the moral costs of the public o¢ cial (see Prediction 3). Finally, the fourth panel of Table   2 indicates that, in accordance with Prediction 4, the proportion of corrupt pairs is the largest in the presence of the intermediary. Although the di¤erence in the proportion of corrupt pairs under no uncertainty and in the presence the intermediary is not quite signi…cant (the p-value from the corresponding Chi-square test is equal to 0.115), the signi…cant di¤erence that we observe when we compare the uncertainty and the intermediary treatments suggests that eliminating uncertainty is not the only channel through which the intermediary facilitates corruption. Given the experimental design, and the equivalence of monetary payo¤s across treatments, the only other possible channel is the reduction in the moral costs of the public o¢ cials -which leads to an increase in the proportion of corruptible o¢ cials and a reduction in the MAB -and the reduction in the moral costs of the private citizens. 24 2 2 This is exactly what we observe in Panel 3 of Table 2 . 2 3 The average bribe o¤ered under uncertainty by all citizens, including those whose bribes were rejected, is 8:75. 2 4 Given the additional subject in the treatment with the intermediary it is the case that the sign of the comparative statics we observe between treatments is also consistent with the predictions generated by the ERC model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . However, the ERC model would not be consistent with the magnitude of the behavioral change that we observe in the presence of the intermediary. More precisely, the additional subject makes the average payo¤ higher; therefore, any gain generated by a corrupt transaction Note: 15% of the citizens in the baseline mistakenly offered a bribe lower than 5 (but greater than 0). We exclude these citizens from the analysis. The citizens who paid a bribe lower than 5 in the remaining treatments did so as a result of mistakes made by the matched officials. 11% of the officials mistakenly stated that the minimum bribe they would be willing to accept was lower than 5 (but greater than 0). We exclude these officials and their matched citizens from the analysis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note that the 51% of corrupt pairs under uncertainty does not re ‡ect the proportion of citizens who attempted to engage in corruption by o¤ering a bribe, but were unsuccessful, and the proportion of o¢ cials who were corruptible but were matched with citizens who decided not to o¤er a bribe. The proportion of pairs "willing to engage in corruption" under uncertainty, i.e. the pairs where the citizen o¤ered a bribe and the o¢ cial was willing to accept a bribe, no matter whether the corruption exchange actually took place, was 79.49%. Our design does not allow comparing the pairs "willing to engage in bribery" across treatments, since in the no uncertainty treatments we can only observe the proportion of o¢ cials willing to engage in bribery and the proportion of matched citizens willing to pay the speci…c MAB. Therefore, by looking at the proportion of corrupt pairs represents a smaller deviation from the average payo¤, making both citizen and o¢ cial more willing to engage in corruption. However, given our parameterization, the di¤erence in average payo¤s between the treatments with and without intermediary is very small and is equal to 0.42 ECU or $0.10, which is a 1%
shift in the average. Therefore, any increase in corrupt behavior that we might observe in the presence of the intermediary is unlikely to be driven by such a small di¤erence in average payo¤s.
in the no uncertainty and in the intermediary treatments we might be under-reporting the proportion of pairs willing to engage in bribery. Nevertheless, the proportion of corrupt pairs in the presence of the intermediary (97.50%) is signi…cantly higher (with a p-value of 0.000) than the proportion of pairs willing to engage in bribery under uncertainty.
In Table 3 we conduct three regression analyses, where the dependent variable is respectively: 1) a dummy equal to 1 if corruption took place, and 0 otherwise; 2) the MAB of the corruptible public o¢ cials; and 3) the bribe paid when corruption took place. In all regressions we control for participants' demographics and we cluster the standard errors to account for possible within-session interdependencies. The e¤ect of the intermediary on actual corruption, MAB and bribe paid
Dependent variable:
Dummy equal to 1 if corruption takes place
MAB of " corrupt" officials
Bribe paid Note: Robust pvalues in parentheses. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for clustering within sessions. In column (1) we report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The citizens and officials who made mistakes, i.e. those with b<5 and MAB<5 are excluded from the regression analysis.
Our estimates con…rm the results obtained in Table 2 . We …nd that the presence of the intermediary induced signi…cantly more citizen-o¢ cial pair to engage in corruption, as compared to both the case with uncertainty, and the case with no uncertainty and no intermediary. Moreover, the intermediary reduced the MAB of the public o¢ cial. By eliminating uncertainty and reducing the MAB, the presence of the intermediary reduced the size of the bribe paid by citizens as compared to the case with uncertainty. The bribe paid is however not signi…cantly lower than under no uncertainty and no intermediary.
In order to investigate if the intermediary facilitates corruption simply by reducing the moral cost of the o¢ cial, and therefore reducing the MAB, or if the possible reduction in citizens' moral costs also plays a role, we conduct probit regressions on the citizens' decision to pay a bribe, restricting the analysis to the two treatments with no uncertainty.
for the MAB of the public o¢ cial with whom each citizen was matched. The e¤ect of the intermediary on the citizen' s propensity to pay a bribe Note: Robust pvalues in parentheses. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for clustering within sessions We report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The citizens and officials that made mistakes, i.e those with b<5 and MAB<5 are excluded from the regressions.
The estimates in the …rst column of Table 4 con…rm that the presence of the intermediary signi…cantly increased the likelihood that citizens paid a bribe. In column 2 we control for the o¢ cial's MAB. The estimates show that, as expected, the citizen's propensity to engage in bribery is lower if the MAB of the o¢ cial is higher. Although the coe¢ cient of the intermediary treatment dummy gets lower in magnitude when controlling for the MAB, it stays signi…cant at the 5 % con…dence level, suggesting that the citizens'higher propensity to bribe in the presence of the intermediary was only partially driven by the lower bribe demanded by the o¢ cials. Since the monetary incentives were identical in the two treatments, we can conclude that the intermediary induced more citizens to pay a bribe also by reducing their moral or psychological costs associated with corruption.
Insights from questionnaire data
At the end of the experimental session, we asked citizens and o¢ cials whether they agreed or disagreed (on a 5-item Likert scale) with the statement "I made fair decisions in the experiment", and we asked the other members of society whether they agreed or disagreed (on a 5-item Likert scale) with the statements "The citizen made fair decisions in the experiment" and "The o¢ cial made fair decisions in the experiment". The statistics in the …rst panel of Table 5 con…rm our experimental …nding of lower moral costs in the presence of the intermediary. In particular, citizens (but not o¢ cials) who acted corruptly in the game were signi…cantly more likely to see their decisions as fair in the presence of the intermediary than in both under uncertainty and under no uncertainty and no intermediary. Conversely, there is no statistically signi…cant di¤erence in citizens'perceived fairness between the baseline and the no uncertainty treatment. 25 2 5 Note that citizens and o¢ cials may or may not consider their decision as fair based not only on the
In an attempt to restrict citizens' and o¢ cials' perceptions of fairness to the e¤ect of their decisions on the OMS's payo¤, we also asked them whether they agreed with the statement "My decisions in the game will be seen as fair by the OMS". The results, presented in the second panel of Table 5 , suggest that in the presence of the intermediary citizens (but not o¢ cials) who acted corruptly were more likely to think that their decisions in the game would be seen as fair by the OMS -although in all treatments the average answers indicate general disagreement with the statement.
Finally, in the third panel of Table 5 we report the OMS's perceived fairness of the decisions of the matched citizens and o¢ cials, conditional on citizens and o¢ cials acting corruptly. The striking result is that the presence of the intermediary induced the OMS to judge the citizen's (but not the o¢ cial's) decision to engage in corruption, and harm them, less harshly.
Overall, citizens'and OMS'answers to our "fairness questions"con…rm that the pres- The fact that we do not …nd the same result for the public o¢ cials is not surprising,
given that the presence of the intermediary does not render accepting a bribe an indirect action. As discussed in previous sections of the paper, in our setting the decline in the moral cost of the public o¢ cial is rather due to the fact that the intermediary acts as a signal that corruption is institutionalized, and therefore more acceptable. Therefore, our questionnaire data cannot capture the channel through which the intermediary lowered the moral cost of corrupt public o¢ cials.
Conclusions
In the last two decades, the problem of corruption has received increasing attention among academics and practitioners around the world. Theoretical and empirical investigations e¤ect of their actions on the OMS's payo¤ -which decreases in case of bribery, no matter the size of the bribe -but also on the e¤ect of their decision on the payo¤ of their partner in corruption -which increases in the case of bribery, but also depends on the size of the bribe. We endeavoured to at least partly address this problem by conducting ordered probit regressions on the citizens'and o¢ cials'answer to the fairness question while controlling for the size of the bribe (or the o¢ cial's MAB). The estimates (not reported here) are consistent with the comparative statics presented in the …rst panel of Table 5 .
into its causes and consequences have rapidly proliferated. Since the seminal work of Shleifer and Vishny (1993), how corruption is "organized" has been recognized as an important determinant of both the existing level of corruption and how damaging corruption is to a country's economy and to society as a whole. This paper focused on one aspect of the organization of corruption that has received little attention in the literature: the presence of agents that act as intermediaries between potential bribers and public o¢ cials.
Anecdotal evidence on the activities of intermediaries in corruption abounds in current
news, yet empirical investigations into the channels through which intermediaries may facilitate corruption are scarce.
Recent theoretical studies suggest that intermediaries increase corruption by reducing uncertainty with respect to whom and how much a potential briber should bribe and by limiting the chances of breaches in corruption deals. This paper proposed an additional overlooked channel through which intermediaries may increase corruption: they might reduce the moral or psychological costs of the citizens and the o¢ cials possibly involved in corruption deals. This is due to the fact that, by rendering the act of bribing an indirect action, intermediaries may create psychological distance between the briber and the illegal activity; moreover, their presence may act as a signal that corruption is institutionalized.
We investigated the moral cost-reduction role that intermediaries may play in corruption by conducting a bribery lab experiment that simulated a petty corrupt transaction between private citizens and public o¢ cials. While the transaction bene…ted a citizeno¢ cial pair, it generated negative externalities on an "other member of society". By conducting di¤erent versions of the game, in which we altered the degree of uncertainty and/or the presence of the intermediary, we were able to isolate the e¤ect that the presence of the intermediaries had on the private citizens'and public o¢ cials'moral or psychological costs associated with corruption. Post-experiment questionnaire data allowed us to further explore the role of the intermediary in altering individuals'judgement of acts of corruption that harmed others.
Our experimental data con…rmed that the proportion of corrupt citizen-o¢ cial pairs signi…cantly increases in the presence of intermediaries. In accordance with our theoretical predictions, we found that, besides eliminating uncertainty, intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of both private citizens and public o¢ cials. Our questionnaire data provided further evidence of more lenient judgement of the act of bribing when carried on indirectly though an intermediary.
The present study represents the …rst step of a broader program of research on the role that intermediaries might play in corrupt exchanges. Future experimental research will allow for a more active role of the intermediary, as well as for repeated corrupt exchanges.
INSTRUCTIONS INTERMEDIARY TREATMENT

General instructions
Thank you all for coming today. You are here to participate in an experiment on individual decision-making. After playing the game you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire. In addition to a $10 participation fee, you will be paid any money you accumulate from the game. You will be paid privately, by check, at the conclusion of the experiment. This study has been reviewed and approved by the FSU Human Subjects
Committee. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter to come to you. Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating the rules may be asked to leave the experiment and may not be paid.
Please read and sign the Consent form that you found on your desk. Please raise your hand if you have any question about any of the information on the Consent form. We will proceed with the experiment once we have collected all signed consent forms.
Detailed Instructions
You will be playing a simple game with the other participants in this room. The number that you have found on your desk is your identi…cation number in the game. We won't ask you to write down your name at any time during this experimental session. At the end of the session, you will need to show your player number to the experimenter in order to receive the money that you collected while playing the game.
Earnings during the experiment will be denominated in Experimental Currency Units, or ECU. At the end of the game your earnings will be converted to dollars at the exchange rate of $1 for 4 ECU. The game you are going to play involves 4 players, each playing a di¤erent role. Your role will be either a Private Citizen, a Public O¢ cial, an Intermediary, or an Other Member of Society. You will be matched with three other participants, and roles will be anonymously and randomly assigned. At no point will you learn the identity of the other members from your group.
Each participant will have 35 ECU to start. The game proceeds as follows. First, the Private Citizen can pay a fee to the matched Intermediary to be given as a bribe to the Public O¢ cial with whom he or she is matched. While the Citizen makes his or her decision, the Public O¢ cial will decide, for each potential bribe amount, whether he would accept or reject the o¤er. If a fee is paid, the You will play this game only once.
Remember, none of you will know the identity of the participants with whom you are playing. You will now …nd out the role that you will play in this game on your computer screen. You will also receive additional information on how to play the game. Remember to use the payo¤ table to help you make your decisions in the game.
Are there any last questions before we begin? Just to remind you, if you have a question at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to you to answer your question in private. Please click Continue to see your role.
